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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to (i) examine the concept of epistemic paternalism and (ii) 
explore the consequences of normative questions one might ask about it. I begin by critically 
examining several definitions of epistemic paternalism that have been proposed, and suggesting 
ways they might be improved. I then contrast epistemic and general paternalism and argue that it’s 
difficult to see what makes epistemic paternalism an epistemic phenomenon at all. Next, I turn to the 
various normative questions one might ask about epistemic paternalism and discuss the literature’s 
assumptions of epistemic consequentialism and veritism. I close by comparing and contrasting 
epistemic paternalism with other phenomena in social epistemology, such as disagreement or 
testimony. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Paternalism is a familiar part of our lives—consider a professor who enforces a no-technology 
policy for her students, an adult pulled over for not wearing their seatbelt, or a spouse who hides 
cake from their partner who just started a new diet. Paternalism is the practice limiting the free 
choices of agents, without their consent, for the sake of promoting their best interests (see Mill 
1869; Dwokin 2010; Grill and Hanna 2018).  
There are many strands of paternalism; this paper focuses on one in particular: epistemic 
paternalism.1 Roughly, one might think about the distinction this way: regular paternalism aims at 
(or has the final goal of) improving another’s decisions or actions; epistemic paternalism aims at 
improving another’s beliefs. More precisely, epistemic paternalism involves interfering with agents, 
without their consent, for their own epistemic good—e.g. to promote their true beliefs, knowledge, 
etc. The next section is devoted to examining various definitions of epistemic paternalism, but on 
most definitions, both the reason for interfering and the way of interfering are (in some sense) 
distinctly epistemic.  
The aim of this paper is twofold: (i) to critically examine the concept of epistemic 
paternalism and (ii) to explore consequences of normative questions one might ask about it. In 
Section 2, I critically examine several proposed definitions of epistemic paternalism. I argue that 
many existing definitions are either too broad or too narrow, and I suggest some ways these 
definitions might be improved. In Section 3, I contrast epistemic and general paternalism, and 
argue that it’s difficult to see what makes epistemic paternalism an epistemic phenomenon at all. In 
Section 4, I turn to normative questions about epistemic paternalism. I examine different 
perspectives by which we might evaluate epistemic paternalism, and discuss the literature’s 
assumptions of epistemic consequentialism and veritism. I close in Section 5 by comparing and 
contrasting epistemic paternalism with other phenomena in social epistemology, such as 
disagreement or testimony. I argue that epistemic paternalism is a uniquely social phenomenon, in 
a way that phenomena such as disagreement and testimony are not.  
The aim of this paper is largely clarificatory, rather than an attempt to argue for a single 
controversial thesis. However, we will address head-on a number of questions at the forefront of 
the epistemic paternalism literature that are normally overlooked or quickly brushed aside. As we 
go, I will flag these questions. Some I will answer or begin to answer, and others I will leave open. 
Either way, the literature on epistemic paternalism should be paying much more attention to them, 
                                                        
1 Discussions of epistemic paternalism include Goldman (1991), Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a, 2013b), Pritchard (2013), 
Ridder (2013), Bullock (2018), Croce (2018). See also Bernal and Axtell (2020) for an edited volume on epistemic 
paternalism.  
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with an eye toward eventually addressing them. Doing so will crucially aid us in answering 
questions about epistemic paternalism, including questions about whether and how it might be 
justified. 
 
 
2. Defining Epistemic Paternalism 
 
This section critically examines several definitions of epistemic paternalism in the literature. 
Goldman (1991) and Lougheed (2020) define epistemic paternalism quite narrowly, focusing on 
withholding evidence for the sake of promoting true beliefs. Lougheed (2020: 1), following 
Goldman (1991: 114), provides the following definition: “If agent X is going to make a doxastic 
decision concerning question Q, and agent Y has control over the evidence that is provided to X, 
then, there are instances when Y need not make available to X all of the evidence relevant to Q if 
doing so will make X more likely to believe the truth about Q.” This suggests the following: 
 
Epistemic Paternalism 1: (i) withholding evidence from someone, (ii) without 
their consent, (iii) to make it more likely that they believe truths (or avoid errors). 
 
This definition is quite narrow. This isn’t necessarily a criticism of Goldman or Lougheed; they 
have the right to examine and/or attempt to justify a narrower phenomenon. However, insofar as 
our goal is to capture the class of cases that we would naturally classify as epistemic paternalism, 
both (i) and (iii) are too narrow.  
First, note that condition (iii) seems to assume veritism, the view that believing truth (and 
avoiding error) is the only ultimate epistemic good. While this is a popular view of epistemic value, 
it is nonetheless controversial (see DePaul 2001; Carballo 2018). We can make the definition more 
ecumenical by revising it in the following way:  
 
Epistemic Paternalism 2: (i) withholding evidence from someone, (ii) without 
their consent, (iii) for their own epistemic good. 
 
This definition, unlike the first, is neutral on epistemic axiology—it is consistent with veritism, but 
also leaves open whether you might engage in epistemic paternalism to promote goods other than 
true belief. For example, you might engage in epistemic paternalism to promote another’s 
epistemically justified beliefs or knowledge; I don’t see a reason to rule this out as a type of 
epistemic paternalism without substantial argument. Veritism is a substantial assumption, and this 
second definition enables us to avoid assuming it without ruling it out.   
 I will spend more time on condition (i), that claims epistemic paternalism necessarily 
involves withholding evidence. The problem with this condition is that there are a number of cases 
of epistemic paternalism that aren’t a matter of withholding evidence from someone. Consider 
providing evidence one wouldn’t have otherwise had or considered. One might fail to consent to 
have information that spoils a movie or show, and even express a desire to not have the 
information (at least at that time, via testimony), but another might give them the information 
anyway. While undesired, this nonetheless constitutes an epistemic improvement (e.g. more true 
beliefs/rational beliefs/knowledge) and thus counts as epistemic paternalism. Bullock (2016; 2018) 
discusses a more serious example: cases of a patient’s right not to know about her medical 
condition if she so chooses. In these cases and others, one may engage in epistemic paternalism 
by providing evidence.  
 A second kind of epistemic paternalism involves interfering with the way another 
processes or weighs evidence. For example, when teaching, I might give the class a philosophical 
argument for p, but then strongly emphasize simplicity while purposefully leaving out discussion 
of the value of explanatory power. I could similarly push skepticism, causing them to value 
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avoiding falsehoods more than they value getting at truths. This could cause them to withhold 
belief in many propositions, but neglect the epistemic value of true belief. Generally, this shows 
that one can engage in epistemic paternalism by influencing another’s epistemology, even if one isn’t 
withholding evidence or manipulating another’s evidence for or against a target proposition.2 
Another example of epistemic paternalism involves controlling the order in which 
someone receives pieces of evidence. Even if the order of evidence wouldn’t matter for ideally 
rational agents, empirical results show that the order in which a normal human reasoner receives 
different pieces of evidence often affects their conclusion (i.e. the ordering effect).3 For example, 
when patients are choosing between treatment options, the order in which information is 
presented may influence their decisions. Bansback et al (2014) make the case for this, and argues 
that patient decisions can be improved by presenting the most important information first. Thus, 
one might interfere with inquiry by simply influencing the order in which one receives pieces of 
evidence.  
Other examples of epistemic paternalism include deception and coercive measures, both 
discussed by Bullock (2018). An example of deception would be teaching a false theory to 
ultimately facilitate understanding of more complex true theory, such as teaching Newtonian 
physics before quantum mechanics (2018: 434). One might engage in coercive epistemic 
paternalism by threatening a consequence if someone doesn't form a certain belief; even if one 
cannot believe directly based on a threat, they could take actions to try to cultivate the belief (2018: 
435).  
The general lesson is this: epistemic paternalism need not merely be about withholding 
evidence, but can involve a number of other epistemic practices. If we understand ‘inquiry’ 
broadly, to include both evidence-gathering and belief-forming practices, then these practices 
might all be classified as instances of interfering with another’s inquiry. Given this, we can modify our 
definition as follows:  
 
Epistemic Paternalism 3: (i) interfering with someone’s inquiry, (ii) without 
their consent, (iii) for their own epistemic good.  
 
This definition parallels the one found in Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a: 51) and Bullock (2018: 434). 
However, while I have even utilized it in my own previous work—Jackson (2020: 201)—I now 
worry it is too broad. To see why, suppose you decided to write a new book in the philosophy of 
mind. It is published, and a professor decides to assign it in their philosophy of mind class. As a 
result of reading the book, students learn a lot of new things about philosophy of mind, and some 
of them radically change their views.4 Now, this case seems to fulfill our definition: as a result of 
writing the book, you've interfered with the inquiry of these students (concerning certain questions 
in philosophy of mind). None of these students consented to you writing this book, but (let’s 
suppose) they’ve epistemically benefitted from reading it. This case seems to fulfill all three 
conditions, but it’s not clear that writing a new book in philosophy of mind should count as 
epistemic paternalism—it's just not clearly paternalistic in any way. 
Now, one might reply in defense of the third definition that the case is actually 
paternalistic—reading assignments in college courses may often be examples of epistemic 
paternalism (although, on the other hand, students normally choose what courses they take, so 
there is room for push back here). Further, if we modify the case so that the student finds the 
book randomly in the library and starts reading it, then it is less clear that the non-consent 
condition has been met. While the student didn’t consent to you writing the book, they decide 
themselves to pick it up and read it. So there is room for some debate about this particular case.  
                                                        
2 See Jackson (forthcoming) and Jackson and Turnbull (forthcoming) for a further discussion of the ways one’s 
broader epistemic situation can affect one’s beliefs without affecting one’s evidence.  
3 See, for example, Walker et al (1972), Dean (1980), Hogarth (1992), Wiegmann, Okan, and Nagel (2012). 
4 Thanks to Frank Jackson for suggesting this case to me.  
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Whether this case is an effective counterexample or not, it points to a more general worry. 
Namely, there are cases where one changes the epistemic landscape in general ways which, in turn, 
eventually have positive epistemic effects on others (by e.g. writing a book), even though those 
others don’t consent to the changing of the landscape. By our third definition, cases like these 
seem to count as epistemic paternalism—you are interfering with inquiry, without consent, for 
another’s epistemic good. However, simply, e.g. writing a book doesn’t seem like it should count 
as epistemic paternalism. If this line of reasoning is sound, then our definition overgeneralizes.  
For this reason, one might wonder if “interfering with inquiry” is too broad—maybe 
epistemic paternalism should be constrained to only count certain kinds of inferences. Or, 
alternatively, maybe this problem can be solved by paying more attention to the consent condition; 
it would be valuable to spell on more clearly what counts as consenting to another’s inferring with 
your inquiry. In general, this discussion points to the following first open question: 
 
Open Question 1: what is the best way to define epistemic paternalism, so that it 
is neither too broad nor too narrow? 
 
In my view, something close to definition 3 is promising, and perhaps with can deal with the 
writing-a-book cases by being clearer about the consent condition, or by narrowing the inference 
condition. Nonetheless, this discussion shows that even basic questions about the definition of 
epistemic paternalism need more attention and refinement.  
 
 
3. Epistemic and General Paternalism 
 
This section continues our exploration of the nature of epistemic paternalism. More specifically, 
it contrasts epistemic paternalism with general paternalism and assesses what makes the former an 
epistemic phenomenon at all. While epistemic paternalism is generally taken to be a type of general 
paternalism, it is also assumed to be a unique subset that is distinguishable from cases of non-
epistemic paternalism. This section argues that either the distinction is much more slippery than it 
appears prima facie, or cases of epistemic paternalism are extremely rare. 
Consider again our definition: to count as epistemic paternalism, the inference must 
happen for the inquirer’s epistemic good. As a preliminary note, it is natural to read this as claiming 
that the inquirer’s epistemic good is a reason for the inference. What kind of reason exactly? Meta-
ethicists distinguish different kinds of reasons—three of which are motivating reasons (facts for 
which someone phi-s), normative or justifying reasons (that count in favor of phi-ing), 
explanatory reasons (that explain why someone phi-ed).5 Since our goal here is simply to define 
epistemic paternalism, I think the best candidate here is motivating reasons—the epistemic benefit 
is the fact for which they interfered, and normative reasons for epistemic paternalism come in 
when we examine the question of whether epistemic paternalism is justified (i.e. in the next 
section). But again, this is a place where those writing about epistemic paternalism should be 
clearer.  
One of the main things that distinguishes epistemic and general paternalism is that the 
inference must be done for the inquirer’s epistemic good. In other words, one of the primary factors 
that characterizes epistemic paternalism is that it is motivated in this distinctly epistemic way. This 
raises the question: need the interferer be motivated only by the inquirer’s epistemic good? What if 
they act partially for the inquirer’s epistemic good? Many cases in the actual epistemic paternalism 
literature are arguably instances of the latter. For example, consider a commonly-used case: a judge 
withholding evidence from a jury to raise the probability they will come to the right verdict (maybe 
the judge has good evidence the jury will weigh the evidence improperly). Presumably, the judge 
                                                        
5 Thanks to Seth Lazar for helpful discussion.  
 5 
might do this in part for the epistemic good involved (the jury’s getting a true belief, justified belief, 
knowledge, etc.) but in real-life cases, a major part of the judge’s motivation is moral: to convict 
the guilty and to let the innocent go free. This latter thing is only contingently connected to the 
jury’s having true beliefs, and if (for some odd reason) the judge thought that the jury’s having 
false beliefs would lead to convicting the guilty and the innocent going free, the judge would likely 
not be motivated to interfere in the same way. This suggests that the epistemic is not the judge’s 
primary motive. 
Goldman (1991), who pioneered the philosophical interest in epistemic paternalism, is 
sensitive to this point. After stating the definition of epistemic paternalism, he says, “the restriction 
to the epistemic viewpoint is again important. In legal settings, for example, there are many non-
epistemic reasons for refusing to provide relevant evidence to jurors” (114). However, in many of 
the examples of epistemic paternalism he provides, it is not at all clear that the agents involved are 
motivated purely by epistemic factors. For instance, he considers epistemic paternalism in 
education curriculum, noting that, in health classes, we don't give “equal time to drug pushers,” 
(121) which has an obvious non-epistemic motivation (keeping kids from doing drugs). He also 
mentions the battle over whether creationism should be taught in schools, noting that excluding 
creationism from curriculum might be a case of epistemic paternalism. However, he even admits 
that, in this case, non-epistemic constitutional issues about including religion in public education 
muddy the waters (122). He also mentions epistemic paternalism in commercial advertising, to 
combat false or deceptive advertising. While he claims that the goal in this is “to keep [buyers] 
from believing untruths about commercial products,” (122) this is clearly not the only goal, and 
most people care about this goal because they care about the actual products people will eventually 
buy. Similar considerations apply to most of Goldman’s other examples, including interfering with 
what news items are covered by the media, and how they are covered—people’s beliefs from the 
news have significant non-epistemic effects.  
This raises the question: are there any cases of “pure” epistemic paternalism, where 
someone is motivated to interfere with another’s inquiry solely on epistemic grounds? These cases 
turn out to be quite rare.6 A potential set of cases involves abstract topics in science, philosophy, 
etc. that have little practical import. For example, Bullock (2018: 434) discusses a teacher acting 
paternalistically to teach her students quantum mechanics. Something similar may happen in some 
philosophy classes—e.g. a professor engages in epistemic paternalism to help her students better 
understand the realist / nominalist debate, and does so purely to facilitate their understanding of 
the issues, rather than for any practical or moral reasons. These seem like plausible cases where 
one might be motivated to interfere with another’s inquiry purely for the sake of promoting true 
/ justified beliefs or knowledge, and not for downstream non-epistemic effects. (Note, of course, 
that not all paternalism regarding abstract concepts would fall into this category, since we might 
sometimes be motivated to help someone understand something abstract for a practical or moral 
reason). Beyond these cases, however, it is difficult to think of real-life cases of purely epistemic 
paternalism.  
The general lesson is that, if epistemic paternalism requires acting only for another's 
epistemic good, it is probably a very rare phenomenon, even if we understand epistemic value 
quite broadly (as including true beliefs, justified beliefs, knowledge, understanding, etc.). This isn’t 
great news for those working on epistemic paternalism, because it means that (i) real-life cases of 
epistemic paternalism are virtually non-existent, and (ii) many of the literature’s supposed examples 
of epistemic paternalism, such as the cases of juries in courtrooms, are not actually cases of 
epistemic paternalism. 
Alternatively, one might maintain that an act can count as epistemic paternalism if it is 
done partially for another’s epistemic good, but practical and moral factors can also be part of the 
motivation. There are several issues with defining epistemic paternalism this way, however. First, 
                                                        
6 Thanks to Seth Lazar for helpful discussion. 
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this move strays from current literature. Goldman (1991), Pritchard (2003), Ahlstrom-Vij (2013), 
and Bullock (2018) are all sensitive to the idea that paternalism motivated partially by the epistemic 
and partially by other, non-epistemic factors doesn’t seem distinctly epistemic. Of course, one 
could push back on this, but would be out of step with current literature.  
Second, if we allow epistemic paternalism to be motivated by both epistemic and non-
epistemic reasons, then it also becomes less clear what makes epistemic paternalism distinctly 
epistemic. Yes, it involves interfering with inquiry, but are those interferences of any special 
epistemic interest if they are done partially or even mostly for practical or moral reasons? For 
example, if I interfere with a juror’s evidence partially to help them come to know who did it, but 
also out of moral concern from the guilty to be punished and the innocent to be set free, it’s not 
clear that my interference ought to be classified as pure epistemic paternalism (it might be classified 
as a pseudo-epistemic paternalism). You also might wonder if the weight of each reason matters: 
what if the epistemic is only a small part of the reason I interfere, and the moral is my primary 
motive? Maybe an act counts as epistemic paternalism if the epistemic reason is weightier than the 
other ones. Or maybe it counts if the epistemic reason is sufficient, on its own, to motivate the 
interferer. These possibilities are underexplored.  
Finally, in many real-life cases, the epistemic motivation is (only or primarily) valuable 
instrumentally. Consider, for instance, why we care about buyer’s beliefs about products they might 
purchase, children’s beliefs about the effects of drugs, or a jury’s beliefs about who committed a 
crime. It is because of the downstream moral and practical effects of these beliefs; we rarely purely 
care about the beliefs themselves. Thus, in many realistic cases, it’s not clear that the distinctly 
epistemic factors are central to the motivation for the interference at all. 
To sum up, when defining epistemic paternalism, we are faced with a dilemma. If epistemic 
paternalism requires acting only for another’s epistemic good, then we’re spending a lot of 
intellectual energy and ink analyzing a practice that rarely occurs (and most of our examples don't 
actually apply). However, if an action can count epistemic paternalism if it is motivated by both 
epistemic and non-epistemic reasons, then it becomes less clear what distinguishes epistemic 
paternalism from regular paternalism, why it would deserve its own literature and analysis, and 
why its justification would differ from that of regular paternalism. This leaves us with at least two 
open questions: 
 
Open question 2: Does epistemic paternalism require acting only for another’s 
epistemic good?  
 
Open question 3: What, if anything, distinguishes epistemic paternalism from 
regular paternalism?  
 
Now, we turn to normative evaluations of both paternalism and epistemic paternalism.  
 
 
4. Evaluating Epistemic Paternalism 
 
We’ve now discussed the nature of epistemic paternalism and ways that it contrasts with general 
paternalism. While many questions are unanswered, and I’ve provided reason to doubt that the 
distinction is well-defined, I’ll proceed as if we have some way to differentiate the two. More 
specifically, in this section, I will (modestly) assume that, if an action is primarily motivated by 
non-epistemic factors, we ought not count it as epistemic paternalism (even if it means that 
epistemic paternalism is a rare phenomenon). Now, we turn to normative questions.  
As a preliminary note, it is instructive to examine justifications for regular paternalism and 
epistemic paternalism side by side, because lessons and concepts from the longstanding, mature 
paternalism literature can be applied to questions about epistemic paternalism, which is newer and 
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less developed. For example, in cases of normal paternalism, there is widely taken to be a 
presumption of non-inference. That is, we should air on the side of not interfering with the free 
choices of others, unless we have an overriding reason to do so (Mill 1869, Dwokin 2010: sec. 3). 
The “burden of proof,” then, is on the person engaging in paternalism to justify their interference. 
One might wonder: does this presumption hold in the epistemic case? Interestingly, most of the 
epistemic paternalism literature thus far involves arguments that it is justified, and almost no one 
has argued that epistemic paternalism is always or almost always impermissible (Bullock 2018 being 
the notable exception). Since so many people seem to be in favor of epistemic paternalism 
(apparently epistemic libertarians are quite rare!), this might suggest that the presumption doesn’t 
hold in the epistemic case. At the same time, philosophers like to argue for controversial theses, 
so this observation about the literature may not mean much. It is nonetheless worth exploring 
whether the presumption that applies to general paternalism also applies epistemically.7  
Now, when it comes to justifications of general and epistemic paternalism, there are at 
least four questions one might ask: 
 
Q1. Is paternalism all-things-considered justified? 
Q2. Is paternalism epistemically justified? 
Q3. Is epistemic paternalism all-things-considered justified? 
Q4. Is epistemic paternalism epistemically justified? 
 
Here, I understand all-things-considered justification to include moral, practical, epistemic reasons, 
and it may also include other types of value, like aesthetic reasons. Note that there are questions 
in addition to Q1–Q4 that isolate each of these types of value, e.g., is epistemic paternalism morally 
justified? Note also that, assuming epistemic paternalism is a subset of general paternalism, then a 
negative answer to Q1 entails a negative answer to Q3, and a negative answer to Q2 entails a 
negative answer to Q4. Similarly, a positive answer to Q4 entails a positive answer to Q2, and a 
positive answer to Q3 entails a positive answer to Q1.  
Several of those who have written on the justification of epistemic paternalism thus far 
have focused on Q3.8 However, this strikes me as a debate that isn’t especially fruitful, because it 
seems difficult, if not impossible, to justify epistemic paternalism on all-things-considered grounds. 
This is because, as Pritchard (2013) and Bullock (2018) point out, whatever epistemic gain 
supposedly motivates epistemic paternalism—e.g. true belief, justified belief, knowledge—will 
almost always be outweighed by moral considerations in favor of personal autonomy and 
sovereignty. (Recall here that, if we understand epistemic paternalism as primarily motivated by 
epistemic considerations, we cannot count the moral or practical value conferred by the content 
of the beliefs; it is purely the epistemic value of the true/justified beliefs/knowledge). Bullock 
(2018: 442–3) gives the following illustrative example: 
 
Suppose, for example, that I play a series of physics lectures to you whilst you are 
sleeping, with the intention that you subconsciously learn quantum mechanics. I 
have good reason to think this will be effective. You happen to have no interest in 
quantum mechanics and the facts that you learn have no bearing on your wellbeing. 
Is this interference justified on balance? …It seems intuitive…that the loss to 
personal sovereignty is in fact a weightier concern than the gain in knowledge: 
indeed, it looks as though you would be morally correct to admonish me for my 
secretive interferences even if you wanted to learn about quantum mechanics. 
 
                                                        
7 Thanks to Nic Southwood.  
8 Including Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a) and Pritchard (2013). Bullock (2018) focuses on moral justification for epistemic 
paternalism (see her fn. 7), but my comments in this paragraph also apply to her view. 
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I agree with Bullock’s assessment of this case—it is both morally and all-things-considered 
impermissible for me to sneak the headphones on you while you are sleeping, simply because I 
want you to learn about quantum mechanics. It is hard to see how the epistemic gain of doing so 
could outweigh the moral losses. This leads to our next open question: 
 
Open Question 4: Can epistemic paternalism ever be morally or all-things-
considered justified? 
 
In general, it is hard to see how epistemic paternalism could be morally or all-things-considered 
justified, especially if it requires acting solely for another’s epistemic good. But there is one notable 
exception to this, a case that Bullock’s argument overlooks—the case of nudges. (This is another 
example of how epistemic paternalism can fruitfully borrow from regular paternalism). The 
concept of a nudge was pioneered by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2003). They argue that, 
in certain situations, we are forced to present choices to others in a certain way. In these cases, no 
matter what we do, we will have some influence on their decisions. Sunstein and Thaler argue that, 
for this reason, we might as well present the choices in a way that makes it more likely that people 
will choose what is best for them. This is called a nudge. For example, in a cafeteria, students are 
more likely to choose foods that are at eye level. One might “nudge” these students by putting 
healthier foods at eye level, making it more likely that they will pick the healthy option. Something 
must be put at eye level, so, the reasoning goes, we might as well choose the healthier food. 
Sunstein and Thaler argue that nudges are a case of paternalism that even libertarians should be 
happy with—it is difficult to see why nudges would be unjustified. This raises the question: is there 
such a thing as epistemic nudges? For example, when presenting people with a body of information, 
we have to present some information before others. As discussed in Section 2, humans are subject 
to ordering effects, so that the order in which pieces of evidence are presented affects people’s 
ultimate judgments. We might present certain information first to facilitate our audience’s 
understanding, even though this might change what they ultimately conclude. After all, we have to 
present it in some order, so we might as well do so in the order that is epistemically best for our 
audience. Nudges may be cases of uncontroversially morally/all-things-considered justified 
epistemic paternalism. Generally, epistemic nudges strike me as a fruitful area for further research.9 
Further, they strike me as one of the rare cases where there is a moral or all-things-considered 
justification for epistemic paternalism. 
 Because morally and all-things-considered justified epistemic paternalism is plausibly rare, 
a potentially more fruitful debate involves Q4, which is the original focus of Goldman’s (1991) 
paper: is epistemic paternalism epistemically justified? This question is about the epistemic 
justification of a particular practice, namely, interfering with inquiry. This assumes that epistemic 
norms can guide behavior. Further, ‘epistemic justification’ (or ‘epistemically justified’) is used here 
in a non-standard way—it doesn’t pick out the thing that turns true unGettiered belief into 
knowledge. 10 Here, ‘justification’ indicates when a practice, on balance, promotes epistemic goods.  
The assumption that epistemic norms can guide action sheds light on why many in the 
epistemic paternalism literature have either implicitly or explicitly adopted a version of epistemic 
consequentialism.11 Epistemic consequentialism is the view that epistemic goods are more 
fundamental than epistemic obligations—what you epistemically ought to do is promote certain 
epistemic goods. Many candidate deontological epistemic norms—e.g. believe in accord with your 
evidence, believe truths, don’t believe contradictions, have probabilistic credences, etc.—are not 
norms that guide action, but are evaluative or teleological norms that apply to belief. It is unclear 
what deontological epistemic principles would govern action; at least, these principles are not 
                                                        
9 Thanks to Matt Kopec. 
10 Thanks to Pamela Robinson. 
11 For recent defenses of epistemic consequentialism, see Singer (2018a, 2018b). See also Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn 
(2018).  
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frequently discussed by epistemologists. However, it nonetheless seems epistemically good to take 
actions that promote valuable epistemic states, such as true belief, justified belief, coherent belief, 
etc. Thus, one way you might epistemically justify a particular practice is by arguing that it will 
likely result in many epistemically good states and/or enable the avoidance of epistemically bad 
states, or, more simply, that it maximizes expected epistemic value (Greaves 2013).  
A potential paper explores what the deontological, epistemic, action-guiding norms might 
be (if they exist), and how those affect the normative status of epistemic paternalism. Many in this 
literature simply assume a version of epistemic consequentialism. However, note that we need not 
be epistemic consequentialists across the board to make sense of Q4. We need only assume 
epistemic consequentialism about epistemic norms for action; we can be deontologists about 
epistemic norms for belief. However, this still leaves the following question wide open: 
 
Open Question 5: Can epistemic norms guide action?  
 
If the answer is no, then we cannot evaluate epistemic paternalism from an epistemic point of view 
at all. And a number of philosophers, including Feldman (2000), Kelly (2002: fn. 30), Berker (2018), 
and Simion (2018), argue that there aren’t epistemic reasons for action. This leads to another 
curious choice point, this time concerning the normative evaluation of epistemic paternalism. 
Either we evaluate epistemic paternalism from a moral or all-things-considered perspective, in 
which case it is hard to see how epistemic paternalism is justified (this is essentially Bullock (2018)’s 
argument, but the exception is the case of nudges), or, we evaluate it epistemically, in which case 
we must controversially assume that that epistemic norms can guide action. The latter might not 
be so bad, insofar as it is reasonable to think some epistemic norms guide certain kinds of 
behaviors, such as how we get evidence (e.g. inquiry, evidence gathering) and what we do with our 
evidence (e.g. critical reasoning, reflection on our evidence).12 But on either natural way of 
evaluating epistemic paternalism, we are left with surprising or controversial results. Now, we turn 
to ways that epistemic paternalism compares and contrasts with other questions in social 
epistemology.  
 
 
5. Epistemic Paternalism and Social Epistemology 
 
Goldman (1991) mentions several times that epistemic paternalism falls under social epistemology, 
or what he calls social epistemics. He explains, “Social epistemics studies the veritistic properties of 
social practices, or institutional rules that directly or indirectly govern communication and doxastic 
decision” (120). Goldman and O’Connor (2019), in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on  
‘Social Epistemology’, define social epistemology as “an enterprise concerned with how people 
can best pursue the truth (whichever truth is in question) with the help of, or in the face of, others.” 
Later in that same article, they categorize some of the central topics in social epistemology as 
testimony, disagreement, how we should identify and respond to expert belief, and epistemic 
injustice.  
 This suggests a noteworthy sense in which epistemic paternalism differs from other 
questions in social epistemology. Many of the topics Goldman and O’Connor mention—
disagreement, testimony, epistemic injustice, and responding to expert opinion—can be framed as 
(at least primarily) concerning the question, “What should I believe?” The disagreement literature 
asks what I should believe in the face of peers who disagree with me. The epistemology of 
testimony is about whether, and under what conditions, I should believe a testifier. Questions 
about experts also concern the question of what I should believe in response to experts (or so-
                                                        
12 See Tidman (1996), Hookway (1999), Friedman (2019). 
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called experts). Even epistemic injustice can be seen as largely concerning the question of what I 
should believe—in response to the testimony of marginalized groups.  
 Interestingly, epistemic paternalism notably differs from these other topics, and is, in some 
sense, more social. This is because epistemic paternalism concerns our epistemic obligations to others—
not merely what we should believe when we encounter other epistemic agents. It is about how we 
ought to affect—or not affect—the beliefs of others. This complex issue doesn’t merely boil down 
to the question of what a single individual should believe, but involves tricky considerations about 
how agents should treat each other, epistemically. One reason this is notable is because epistemic 
obligations to other people are rarely discussed, in any literature; in fact, many assume that our 
obligations to others are merely moral ones.13 Further, it is noteworthy that many issues in social 
epistemology are less social than one might have thought, and can be grouped alongside issues in 
traditional epistemology, at least insofar as they all concern the question, "What should I believe?" 
Of course, the fact that epistemic paternalism goes beyond this question might explain some why 
some of the issues mentioned above might crop up—e.g. whether there are epistemic reasons for 
action, whether epistemic consequentialism is true, and how we should understand epistemic 
justification when it comes to our obligations to others. Nonetheless, I think this shows that we 
can further divide social epistemology into distinct and interesting categories, and some traditional 
issues in social epistemology might be notably “less social” than others. This brings us to a final 
open question: 
 
Open Question 6: What is the best way to define social epistemology, and how 
should we categorize its topics?  
 
While, unlike the other questions, this question is not necessarily crucial for those writing on 
epistemic paternalism to address, I nonetheless think it alludes to stimulating and significant 
general issues in social epistemology.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
My primary goal has been to critically examine the concept of epistemic paternalism and to survey 
and evaluate various normative questions we might ask about it. While this paper has raised a lot 
of problems for both the concept of epistemic paternalism and its evaluation, I nonetheless hope 
that I’ve enabled clearer thinking about epistemic paternalism. This includes what epistemic 
paternalism is, what controversial commitments it may carry (e.g. potentially that there are 
epistemic reasons for action, and maybe certain strands of epistemic consequentialism), and what 
commonly-made assumptions in the literature are unnecessary (e.g. veritism). Ultimately, I hope 
this paper facilitates the aim of accurately answering questions about what kinds of epistemic 
paternalism (if any) are justified, under what circumstances they are justified, and in what sense 
they are justified.  
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13 One exception is Basu (2019), who discusses a potential epistemic obligation to others: not to wrong others in what 
we believe about them. (Note also that Basu advocates for moral encroachment, so this obligation is both epistemic 
and moral, since, according to moral encroachment, the moral can affect epistemic rationality).  
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